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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1991). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly conclude that, on the 
record before it, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's grant of summary judgment 
is reviewed under a "correctness" standard. Daniels v. Deseret 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 771 P.2d 1100, 1101-02 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 781 P.2d 878 & 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). The 
appellate court considers the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the losing party and will affirm only where it appears that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact or 
where, even according to the facts as contended by the losing 
party, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Neither the trial court's conclusion that the facts are undisputed 
nor its legal conclusions based on those facts are accorded any 
deference. Barlow Soc'y v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 723 P.2d 398, 399 
(Utah 1986). 
2. Was there sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the elevator in which the plaintiff was 
- 1 -
injured was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the 
user? 
Standard of Review: In determining whether the trial court 
properly found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, 
the appellate court views the facts and inferences to be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party. Utah 
State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light Co., 776 
P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989). 
3. Was there* sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the defendants had notice of the 
dangerous condition of the elevators in the building at 185 South 
State Street? 
Standard of Review: In determining whether a genuine issue of 
material fact exists, the appellate court reviews the facts and the 
inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable 
to the losing party. Utah State Coalition, 776 P.2d at 634. 
4. Did the trial court err in denying the plaintiff leave to 
amend her complaint to add a claim based on the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur? 
Standard of Review: The decision to allow an amendment of a 
pleading is discretionary with the trial court and will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion resulting in 
prejudice to the appellant. Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 
(Utah 1983). An appellate court will find an abuse of discretion 
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if it is left with a definite and firm conviction, after reviewing 
the whole record, that the trial court erred, Betz v. Chena Hot 
Springs Group, 742 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Alaska 1987); if the trial 
court's exercise of discretion is manifestly unreasonable or based 
on untenable grounds or untenable reasons, Davis v. Globe Mach. 
Mfg. Co., 684 P. 2d 692, 698 (Wash. 1984); or if the trial court 
misapplied or ignored recognized legal principles guiding the 
exercise of its discretion, Franklin v. Bartsas Realty, Inc., 598 
P.2d 1147, 1149 (Nev. 1979); In re Estate of Kunzler, 707 P.2d 461, 
465 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985). The legal standard guiding the exercise 
of a trial court's discretion in granting or denying leave to amend 
is that leave to amend should be "freely given when justice so 
requires." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONSf STATUTES OR RULES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is determinative of the 
first three issues. It provides, in relevant part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. . . . 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) is determinative of the 
fourth issue. That rule provides, in relevant part: 
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served 
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or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive 
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed 
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time 
within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may 
amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in 
the Court Below. 
The plaintiff, Deanna Kleinert, brought this action to recover 
damages for personal injuries she sustained in an elevator 
designed, manufactured, installed and maintained by the defendants. 
Record (lfR.!f) at la-6. The plaintiff amended her complaint once 
with leave of court to add additional defendants. id. at 136-37, 
144-50. The plaintiff then moved for leave to file a second 
amended complaint to add a cause of action based on the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur. Id. at 242-53. While that motion was pending, 
defendant Kimball Elevator Company moved for summary judgment on 
the grounds that the plaintiff could not sustain her burden of 
proving the allegations of her strict products liability claim. 
Id. at 268. The trial court granted Kimball's motion for summary 
judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to file a 
second amended complaint. Id. at 377-78. The remaining defendants 
then moved for summary judgment on the grounds that they had no 
notice of any dangerous condition of the elevator, id. at 381-93. 
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The trial court granted the remaining defendants' motion for 
summary judgment, id. at 424-25, and this appeal followed. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
In 1984 the plaintiff worked as a legal secretary for a law 
firm with offices in the building at 185 South State Street in Salt 
Lake City. R. at 341. Defendants HRB Company, the Boyer Company, 
185 South State Associates, Boyer-Gardner Properties Partnership, 
H. Roger Boyer, Kern C. Gardner and 185 South State Owners7 
Association owned and managed the building.1 Defendant Kimball 
Elevator Company manufactured, installed and maintained the 
elevators in the building. R. at 291, 328 & 467. 
On April 16, 1984, at about 4:45 p.m., Ms. Kleinert left her 
work station on the eighth floor of the building and went to the 
sixth floor to take the mail and some documents to be photocopied. 
She then got on an elevator to return to the eighth floor. She was 
the only person on the elevator. The elevator doors closed, and 
the lights inside the elevator went out. id. at 342. The elevator 
was pitch dark except for lights above the doors that indicated the 
floor. Id. at 343-44. Ms. Kleinert pressed the Open Door button, 
but the doors would not open. Id. at 344-45. The elevator then 
moved upward several floors and stopped abruptly, causing the 
1
 For purposes of their motion for summary judgment, these 
defendants did not dispute the plaintiff's assertion that they 
owned or managed the common areas of the building, including the 
elevators. R. at 387. 
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plaintiff to lose her balance, id. at 345-46. For the next forty 
minutes or so, the plaintiff was trapped inside the elevator. The 
elevator would rise and stop, then fall and stop erratically. Id. 
at 345-50. During this time Ms. Kleinert became completely 
disoriented. She tried to brace herself, but the unexpected 
movement of the elevator caused her to fall, striking her head, 
arms and legs against the walls, doors and handrail inside the 
elevator. id. at 347-48. She tried to use the emergency phone 
inside the elevator, but it did not work, and, when the elevator 
moved suddenly downward, she cut her hand on the edge of the phone 
door. id. at 348-49. After about forty minutes, the elevator 
stopped between the fifth and sixth floors. Ms. Kleinert was able 
to pry open the elevator doors enough to jump to the floor below. 
Id. at 351-52. 
Within minutes after escaping from the elevator, the plaintiff 
reported the incident to her boss, David Hirschi. id. at 441-42. 
She was tousled, distraught and shaking, and she appeared to have 
been crying. id. at 442-43. Ms. Kleinert told Mr. Hirschi that 
she had been caught in the elevator, that it had dropped some 
floors and that she had been jostled during the experience, id. at 
443. 
Ms. Kleinert made a claim for worker's compensation as a 
result of the incident. Her employer denied her claim, but an 
administrative law judge found that the plaintiff had sustained 
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injuries as a result of a compensable industrial accident. Id. at 
360. 
The plaintiff brought this action alleging that defendant 
Kimball was strictly liable for the damages she suffered as a 
result of her experience in the elevator because the elevator was 
defective and unreasonably dangerous for its expected use. Id. at 
146-47. She further alleged that the remaining defendants were 
liable for failing to repair the elevator before the incident on 
April 16, 1984, or for failing to warn business invitees, such as 
the plaintiff, of the dangerous condition of the elevator. Id. at 
147-48. The trial court denied her motion for leave to file a 
second amended complaint to allege res ipsa loquitur and granted 
the defendants7 motions for summary judgment. Id. at 377-78 & 424-
25. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred in granting the defendants summary 
judgment on the plaintiff's claims for strict products liability 
and negligence. The plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence from 
which a jury could infer that the elevator in which she was injured 
was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user 
(point I). The plaintiff also produced sufficient evidence to 
raise triable issues of fact as to whether the defendants knew or 
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should have known of the dangerous condition of the elevator and 
whether they breached any duty they owed the plaintiff (point II). 
The trial court also erred in denying the plaintiff leave to 
amend her complaint to allege a claim based on res ipsa loquitur. 
Leave to amend should be freely given in the interests of justice. 
None of the grounds the defendants relied on in opposing the 
plaintiff's motion for leave to amend justified denying the 
plaintiff leave to amend. (Point III.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
COULD NOT SUPPORT HER PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIM AGAINST 
KIMBALL ELEVATOR COMPANY. 
The plaintiff's claim against Kimball Elevator Company was 
based on the doctrine of strict products liability, which imposes 
liability on "one who sells any product in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user . . . ." Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 402A (adopted in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel 
Co., 601 P. 2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979)). Kimball moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff could not sustain her 
burden of proving the allegations of her strict products liability 
claim because she had not provided competent expert testimony to 
prove a product defect. R. at 268, 272. The trial court agreed 
and granted Kimball's motion for summary judgment. Jd. at 376-78. 
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In doing so, the trial court ignored established Utah law governing 
the grant of summary judgments and imposed a heavier burden on 
products liability plaintiffs than is required under Utah law. 
In reviewing the correctness of a trial court's grant of 
summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard as 
the trial court. See Barlow Soc'y v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 723 
P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1986). The question is whether "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Any 
doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact must be resolved 
in favor of the party opposing the motion, and all reasonable 
inferences that can fairly be drawn from the evidence must be 
evaluated in a light most favorable to the opposing party. Bowen 
v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). 
Kimball claimed that the plaintiff had not raised a genuine 
issue of fact as to whether or not the elevator in which she was 
trapped was "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the 
user." A defective condition is "a condition not contemplated by 
the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to 
him." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment g. A defective 
condition makes a product "unreasonably dangerous" if it is 
dangerous "to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by 
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the ordinary consumer . . . , with the ordinary knowledge common to 
the community as to its characteristics." id. comment i. The 
plaintiff testified that she was trapped inside the elevator for 
some forty minutes, that the lights inside the elevator went off, 
that neither the doors nor the emergency telephone worked properly, 
and that the elevator would rise, stop and fall errcitically and 
abruptly, throwing her against the walls, doors and handrail. 
Certainly one could reasonably infer from this evidence, evaluated 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as the trial court 
was required to evaluate it, that the elevator was in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user. Users of elevators 
do not contemplate that an elevator will act as the elevator in 
this case did. They do not expect to be trapped inside the 
elevator and thrown against its walls, as the plaintiff was. 
Because the plaintiff's testimony created a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether or not the elevator was in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user, the trial court erred 
in granting Kimball summary judgment. 
Kimball argued, however, and the trial court apparently 
agreed, that, under Utah law, a plaintiff "must either prove the 
alleged defect with competent expert testimony or be dismissed." 
R. at 277. Kimball misstated a plaintiff's burden under Utah law. 
"Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed 
by any of the kinds of evidentiary material listed in Rule 56(c), 
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except the mere pleadings themselves . . . ." Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).2 Rule 56(c) does not require 
expert testimony. Rather, it allows a party to show that there is 
a genuine issue of material fact by deposition testimony (among 
other ways). As shown above, the plaintiff's deposition testimony 
was enough to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
the elevator was "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous 
to the user or consumer.11 None of the law Kimball relied on below 
required any more. 
Kimball first argued that section 78-15-6 of the Utah Code 
required expert testimony. R. at 277-79. That section states, in 
relevant part: 
In any action for damages for personal injury . . . 
allegedly caused by a defect in a product: 
(1) No product shall be considered to 
have a defect or to be in a defective 
condition, unless at the time the product was 
sold by the manufacturer or other initial 
seller, there was a defect or defective 
condition in the product which made the 
product unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer. 
2
 Celotex, of course, dealt with Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56, not the Utah rule. However, Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56 is substantially similar in all relevant respects to 
the federal rule. Accordingly, this court can look to federal 
courts' interpretation of the federal rule when construing Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Prowswoodf Inc. v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah 1984). 
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(3) There is a rebuttable presumption 
that a product is free from any defect or 
defective condition where the alleged defect 
in the plans or designs for the product or the 
methods and techniques of manufacturing, 
inspecting and testing the product were in 
conformity with government standards 
established for that industry which were in 
existence at the time the plans or designs for 
the product or the methods and techniques of 
manufacturing, inspecting and testing the 
product were adopted. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6 (1987). 
Section 78-15-6 was initially enacted in 1977 as part of the 
Utah Product Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-15-1 et seq. 
(1977). In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. , 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 
1985), the court declared the entire act, including section 78-15-
6, invalid since the act's statute of repose, section 78-15-3, was 
unconstitutional and the remainder of the act was not severable. 
See 717 P.2d at 686. In 1989, after Ms. Kleinert's experience in 
the elevator, the legislature reenacted an amended section 78-15-3, 
without its unconstitutional statute of repose, and provided that 
the act's other provisions were severable. Since there was no 
valid section 78-15-6 in 1984, when the plaintiff was injured, 
section 78-15-6 arguably does not apply in this case. But even if 
it did apply, it does not require a plaintiff to prove a product 
defect by expert testimony. 
Section 78-15-6 merely requires the plaintiff to prove that 
the product was in a defective condition when it was sold and 
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establishes a rebuttable presumption that the elevator was free 
from any defect or defective condition if it conformed with 
government standards. The statute is silent as to how the 
plaintiff must prove a defect or overcome the presumption. Nothing 
in the statute says that the plaintiff must prove a defect by 
expert testimony, as Kimball claimed. Moreover, the effect of any 
presumption was simply to place on the plaintiff the burden of 
going forward with the evidence or of making a prima facie case. 
Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co. . 121 Utah 420, 242 P.2d 
764, 769 (1952). The plaintiff met this burden. She introduced 
evidence—namely her own deposition testimony—from which a jury 
could have concluded that the elevator was in a defective 
condition, despite any compliance with government standards. Under 
these circumstances, any presumption disappeared, id., and it was 
for the jury to determine whether the plaintiff's evidence was 
sufficient to prove a product defect. 
Kimball also argued that Utah case law required expert 
testimony in a case such as this. For this argument, Kimball 
relied on Dowland v. Lyman Products for Shooters, 642 P.2d 380 
(Utah 1982), and Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In Dowland, the court affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the 
defendants on a strict products liability claim. The only issue on 
appeal was whether the trial court should have excluded testimony 
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by one of the defendant's expert witnesses. 642 P. 2d at 380 & 381. 
The court held that, even if the trial court erred in admitting the 
testimony, the error was harmless because the other evidence in the 
case provided the jury with a substantial basis for concluding that 
the product did not contain an unreasonably dangerous defect. Id. 
at 381-82. The plaintiff in Dowland produced four expert witnesses 
and still lost. But the fact that expert testimony may not be 
enough to convince a jury in a particular case does not mean that 
expert testimony is always required. If Dowland stands for 
anything, it is that the issue of product defect is ordinarily for 
the jury to decide. 
Similarly, Reeves does not require expert testimony to prove 
a product defect. Reeves brought the action after he suffered 
severe injuries allegedly as a result of taking certain drugs 
manufactured by the defendants. The trial court granted the 
defendants' motions for summary judgment on the grounds that, among 
other things, there was a lack of evidence of causation. On 
appeal, the court held that there was sufficient evidence in the 
record, even without opposing affidavits, to raise a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether Reeves' injuries were caused by the 
drugs. In the process, the court held that expert medical 
testimony was required to establish causation because whether or 
not the defendants' product could have caused Reeves' injuries was 
a matter "outside the knowledge and experience of lay people." 764 
- 14 -
P.2d at 640. Causation is not the issue in this case. The issue 
is whether or not the elevator was in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user. That is a matter well within 
the knowledge and experience of lay people. Lay people, such as 
jurors, are the average users of elevators and therefore are 
especially well qualified to decide whether an elevator that acted 
as the plaintiff claimed the elevator in this case acted can be 
considered to be in a defective condition, that is, whether it was 
in "a condition not contemplated by the ultimate" user that made it 
dangerous "to an extent beyond that contemplated by the ordinary" 
user. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A & comments g & i_. 
Thus, expert testimony was not required. Cf_. Nixdorf v. Hicken. 
612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980) (expert testimony was not necessary 
to show that a doctor who left a needle in a patient was negligent 
since "the propriety of the treatment received is within the common 
knowledge and experience of the layman"). 
If Reeves is relevant to this case at all, it is because it 
recognized that summary judgment should not be loosely granted: "In 
considering a motion for summary judgment, it is not appropriate 
for a court to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility" of 
witnesses. 764 P.2d at 639. "[I]t only takes one sworn statement 
to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy and 
create [a genuine issue of material fact]." Id. at 640. The 
plaintiff's deposition testimony in this case was just such a sworn 
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statement, which raised genuine issues of material fact precluding 
summary judgment. 
Cases from other jurisdiction support the plaintiff's position 
that expert testimony was not required for her to get to a jury. 
In Power v. Otis Elevator Company, 409 So.2d 389 (La. Ct. App. 
1982), the plaintiff had fallen down an escalator. She claimed 
that the escalator had jerked violently, causing her to fall. Her 
evidence at trial consisted of her own testimony and that of two 
witnesses. 409 So.2d at 390. The defendant presented testimony 
from its own mechanics, who testified that there had never been any 
trouble with the escalator before and that the escalator was 
constructed in such a way that it would stop if the current were 
interrupted. The defendant also presented the testimony of an 
escalator engineer who stated that, in his opinion, it was not 
possible for the escalator to move as the plaintiff claimed it did. 
The court held: 
The jury heard all this testimony and necessarily 
concluded that the escalator did not malfunction and that 
the plaintiff's fall was more probably due to her failure 
to take adequate precautions as she rode the escalator. 
. . . [P]laintiff's evidence was not compelling and the 
jury had a sufficiency of evidence before it to conclude 
that the plaintiff did not prove her case of a defect in 
the escalator. For us to reverse would constitute an 
invasion of the fact finding function of the jury. 
Id. at 391. Although the plaintiff lost in Power, the court 
recognized that where, as here, the evidence of a malfunction is 
disputed, it is for the jury to decide whether there was a defect 
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in the machine. In fact, some courts have held that expert opinion 
testimony that a product was defective or unreasonably dangerous is 
inadmissible because it invades the province of the jury. See, 
e.g. , Willoughby v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 198 F.2d 604, 605-06 
(D.C. Cir. 1952); Aller v. Rodaers Mach. Mfg. Co.. 268 N.W.2d 830, 
840 (Iowa 1978). By taking the issue of product defect away from 
the jury, the trial court in this case invaded "the fact finding 
function of the jury." Cf. Power, 409 So.2d at 391. 
Finally, Kimball argued below that the public policy 
underlying products liability in Utah mandated dismissal of the 
plaintiff's claim. Just the opposite is true. 
When Utah first adopted strict products liability, it did so 
"to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective 
products [would be] borne by the manufacturers that put such 
products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are 
powerless to protect themselves." Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco 
Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1979) (quoting Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Prods. . Inc.
 r 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962)). The court 
noted that strict products liability was created "because of the 
economic and social need for the protection of consumers in an 
increasingly complex and mechanized society, and because of the 
limitations in the negligence and warranty remedies." Id. at 157 
(quoting Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1166 (1978)). 
In other words, strict products liability was meant to protect 
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consumers and other users of products, like the plaintiff, not 
manufacturers, like Kimball. 
In striking down the former Utah Product Liability Act, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that the act's statute of repose violated 
the open court's clause of the Utah Constitution, article I, 
section 11, which provides that "every person, for an injury done 
to him . . ., shall have remedy by due course of law . . . ." See 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 683 (Utah 1985). It 
is that very right that the trial court's ruling deprived the 
plaintiff of. If a plaintiff were required to prove a product 
defect by expert testimony in every case, as Kimball argued and the 
trial court apparently agreed, product manufacturers would be 
insulated from liability in many cases. It was because we live in 
"an increasingly complex and mechanized society," filled with 
complex machines that we only partially understand, that the 
doctrine of strict products liability developed. See Hahn, 601 
P.2d at 157 (quoting Daly, 575 P.2d at 1166). The trial court's 
ruling harks back to the time when a manufacturer could place 
defective products on the market with impunity because it was too 
difficult for the plaintiff to prove that the manufacturer was 
negligent. The law has come a long way since that time. Current 
Utah law did not require the plaintiff to establish a product 
defect by expert testimony. It was for the jury to decide whether 
the plaintiff's testimony was sufficient to meet her burden of 
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establishing a product defect. The trial court erred by taking the 
plaintiffs case against Kimball away from the jury. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS NOT A 
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER THE 
DEFENDANTS HAD SUFFICIENT NOTICE OF THE DANGEROUS 
CONDITION OF THE ELEVATORS. 
The remaining defendants, HRB Company, Boyer Company, 185 
South State Associates, Boyer-Gardner Properties Partnership, H. 
Roger Boyer, Kern C. Gardner and 185 South State Owners' 
Association,3 moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the 
plaintiff had no evidence to show that the defendants had notice of 
the alleged dangerous condition of the elevators in the building at 
185 South State and thus had no duty to repair or warn the 
plaintiff of the dangerous condition. 
The Utah Supreme Court has never considered the degree of care 
that the owner or operator of an automatic passenger elevator owes 
to a passenger, but most courts that have considered the issue have 
held the owner or operator of an elevator to the same high 
standards of care as a common carrier. See, e.g. , Cash v. Otis 
Elevator Co. . 684 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Mont. 1984); Smith v. Munaerr 
532 P.2d 1202, 1204-05 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974), cert, denied (1975). 
Under Utah law, although a carrier is not an insurer of its 
3
 For convenience, the remaining defendants will be referred 
to collectively as "the defendants." 
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passengers7 safety, it must exercise the utmost care to protect its 
passengers against accidents. See McMaster v. Salt Lake Transp. 
Co., 108 Utah 207, 159 P.2d 121, 122 (1945); Christensen v. Oregon 
Short Line R.R. Co. , 35 Utah 137, 148, 99 P. 676 (1909). 
Because of the greater duty the owner of an elevator owes its 
passengers, some courts have held that, where, as here, a 
passenger, through no fault of her own, is injured when an elevator 
malfunctions and the occurrence cannot be accounted for without 
negligence, she has presented sufficient evidence, not only to get 
by summary judgment, but also to sustain a verdict in her favor. 
See, e.g., Chapman v. Turnbull Elevator, Inc., 158 S.E.2d 438, 440 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1967); Koenia v. 399 Corp., 240 N.E.2d 164, 166-67 
(111. Ct. App. 1968). 
At a minimum, the defendants, as property owners,4 owed the 
plaintiff a duty to use reasonable care to make conditions in the 
building reasonably safe for her. Williams v. Melby, 699 P. 2d 723, 
726, 727 (Utah 1985). "The care to be exercised in any particular 
case depends upon the circumstances of that case and on the extent 
of foreseeable danger involved and must be determined as a question 
of fact." Id. at 727 (quoting DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 
P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983)). If a reasonably prudent person should 
4
 For purposes of their motion for summary judgment, the 
defendants conceded that they were the owners and managers of the 
common areas of the building at 185 South State, including the 
elevators. R. at 387. 
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have known or, by the exercise of reasonable care, could have 
learned that the elevators constituted a dangerous condition, the 
defendants can be liable for not taking adequate safety 
precautions. See id. at 728. 
The plaintiff presented sufficient facts from which a jury 
could conclude that a reasonably prudent person should have known 
or could have learned, by the exercise of reasonable care, that the 
elevators constituted a dangerous condition and should have taken 
adequate precautions to prevent someone like the plaintiff from 
being injured in one of the elevators:5 
Between January 1, 1983, and April 16, 1984, Kimball employees 
responded to forty-nine "trouble calls11 regarding the elevators at 
185 South State, fourteen of which involved persons stuck in the 
elevators. See R. at 400 f 17. 
The plaintiff herself had been stuck in the elevators at 185 
South State three or four times before the incident on April 16, 
1984. On those occasions, she had notified her employer's 
personnel manager about the problems, and the personnel manager had 
indicated that she would contact defendant Boyer Company. See id. 
at 399 ff 10-11. 
5
 These facts were set out in the plaintiff's memorandum in 
opposition to the defendants7 motion for summary judgment. See R. 
at 396 f 7, 397 f 13, 399-401 ff 10-20. In their reply memorandum, 
the defendants did not dispute these facts, although they did 
dispute their significance. See R. at 413-15. 
- 21 -
The property manager for the Boyer Company testified that he 
would be notified of elevator stoppages either by a tenant in the 
building or by Kimball. See id. at 399-400 f 12. 
The property manager for the Boyer Company further testified 
that he had notice of the elevators breaking down, not working, 
stopping and catching people inside and not responding to calls or 
going to the wrong floor. See id. at 396 f 7. The elevators at 
185 South State caused him special concern because they had "a 
higher incidence of elevator malfunctions" than the elevators at 
other properties he had managed. See id. at 401 f 19. 
A Kimball employee testified that he could "document several 
cases" where people had started an elevator rocking and "trip[ped] 
it electrically," causing it to go up and down. See R« at 397 f 13 
& 333. He further testified that there had been a "common problem" 
with the elevators at 185 South State in that people would open the 
panels inside the elevators so that they could bypass switches and 
get into the workings of the computer that regulated the elevators. 
It became "such a problem" that Kimball had to put special locks on 
the panels. See id. at 397 f 13, 401 f 18 & 335. 
It was a common joke among those who worked in the building 
that the elevators were always getting stuck. Lights in the 
elevators had gone out on other occasions. The plaintiff testified 
that no one paid much attention to the elevator alarms because 
"they go off all the time." See id. at 400 ff 13-15. 
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The plaintiff's boss testified that, before the accident, he 
had heard talk around the office that the elevators were not 
working properly, that the lights would not come on and that the 
elevators would not stop at a floor. He further testified that 
people in the building "were generally aware . . . that there was 
a potential problem" with elevators dropping one or more floors, 
but he could not say whether they were aware of the potential 
problem before or after the plaintiff's accident. See id. at 400 
f 16, 443-44 & 461. 
From all this evidence a jury could reasonably conclude that 
the defendants had notice of the dangerous condition of the 
elevator. Cf. Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 662 (11th 
Cir. 1988) (evidence of substantially similar incidents eighteen 
months before was sufficient for the jury to infer notice). 
Although the defendants may not have previously known the elevator 
that injured the plaintiff to act precisely as it did in this case, 
they were on notice of many of the problems the plaintiff 
complained of. They knew or should have known of lights in the 
elevators going out. They knew or should have known that the 
elevators had a tendency to drop floors and not stop at a floor. 
They certainly knew that people were frequently stuck in the 
elevators. And they should have foreseen that a person stuck in 
the elevator might get injured if the elevator moved suddenly. One 
could reasonably conclude from all the evidence, taken as a whole, 
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that the defendants should have reasonably anticipated that one of 
their elevators would malfunction, injuring the plaintiff. 
This is especially true if Utah were to follow "the best 
reasoned authorities and a majority of them," Smith v. Munger. 532 
P.2d at 1205 (guoting Lander v. Hornbeck, 179 P. 21 (Okla. 1918)), 
which hold an elevator owner to the same high standard as a common 
carrier. A carrier "is bound to a much longer forecast of the 
dangers which surround [its passengers] than he is as regards 
strangers." Giger v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 60 F.2d 63, 64 (2d 
Cir. 1932) (per L. Hand, J.), quoted with approval in Johnson v. 
Lewis, 121 Utah 218, 240 P.2d 498, 502 (1952). A carrier is 
required to exercise "the 'highest human foresight' possible in the 
circumstances." id. (citation omitted). In a case such as this, 
the court is "not therefore to measure what the defeadant should 
have foreseen by ordinary standards; the law imposes on him a 
meticulous regard for possibilities which should ordinarily be 
ignored." Id. 
The defendants argued below that they had fulfilled whatever 
duty they had by contracting for regular inspection and maintenance 
of the elevators. The Eleventh Circuit rejected a similar argument 
in Jones v. Otis Elevator Co.. 861 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1988). The 
court held that the plaintiff's testimony about how the elevator 
operated, as well as her expert's testimony, although disputed, was 
sufficient to establish the defendant's negligence in maintaining 
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the elevator and that it was for the jury to weigh the conflicting 
evidence and inferences. 861 F.2d at 663. See also McGowan v. 
Devonshire Hall Apts., 420 A.2d 514, 519 (Pa. Super. 1980) 
(evidence that the owner provided for regular inspection and 
service of the elevator and that inspections immediately before and 
after the accident showed no defect did not justify taking the case 
from the jury; the jury was free to conclude that the owner had not 
provided for sufficiently thorough or frequent inspections). An 
elevator owner has a nondelegable duty to provide for the safety of 
its passengers. See, e.g., Phegley v. Graham, 215 S.W.2d 499, 503-
04 (Mo. 1948). The defendants cannot escape liability simply by 
showing that they contracted with Kimball to service the elevators. 
See, e.g. , Cash v. Otis Elevator Co. , 684 P.2d 1041, 1045-46 (Mont. 
1984); Buford v. Chicago Housing Auth., 476 N.E.2d 427, 436 (111. 
App. Ct. 1985) (housing authority could be liable even though an 
elevator mechanic checked the elevator the day before the 
accident). 
"Summary judgment should be granted with great caution in 
negligence cases." Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 
1985) (citations omitted). Whether the defendants used reasonable 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFF LEAVE 
TO AMEND TO ADD A CLAIM FOR RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
The plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to add a claim 
based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Kimball opposed her 
motion on the grounds that res ipsa loquitur cannot apply in a 
strict products liability action. R. at 269. The remaining 
defendants opposed the plaintiff's motion on timeliness grounds. 
Id. at 256-58. The trial court denied the motion. Because the 
basis for the trial court's ruling is not clear, see icl. at 484-87, 
the plaintiff will address both grounds for opposing the motion. 
Kimball argued that, where a plaintiff specifically relies on 
a theory of strict products liability, she may not rely on res ipsa 
loquitur but must prove the existence of a product defect by expert 
testimony. Id. at 285-86. As shown in part I, supra, the 
plaintiff was not required to prove her strict products liability 
claim by expert testimony. But regardless of whether expert 
testimony is required in a strict products liability action, the 
plaintiff was still entitled to rely on res ipsa loquitur. 
A careful reading of the plaintiff's proposed Second Amended 
Complaint shows that the plaintiff was not trying to assert res 
ipsa loquitur to prove her strict products liability claim against 
Kimball. Instead, she wanted to assert a separate claim, based on 
res ipsa loquitur, against all the defendants. See R. at 250 
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(Third Claim for Relief). Utah law expressly allows a party to 
plead claims for relief in the alternative. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
8(a); Rosander v. Larsen, 14 Utah 2d 1, 376 P.2d 146, 146 (1962). 
To get to a jury on a claim of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff 
only had to show that (1) the accident was of a kind that 
ordinarily would not have happened had the defendants used due 
care, (2) the instrument or thing causing the injury was at the 
time of the accident under the management and control of the 
defendants, and (3) that the accident happened irrespective of any 
fault on the part of the plaintiff. Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional 
Medical Center. 791 P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1990) (citing Moore v. 
James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 96, 297 P.2d 221, 224 (1956)). To state a 
claim based on res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff was not required to 
allege, much less prove, a product defect—by expert testimony or 
otherwise. 
Kimball tried to use the plaintiff's alternative theories of 
recovery to suggest that, if the plaintiff was hurt by a product 
defect, then something other than the defendants7 negligence could 
have caused the accident, which means that the accident was not of 
a type that ordinarily would not have happened except for someone's 
negligence. See R. at 285-86. The argument ignores rule 8, which 
expressly allows a plaintiff to plead inconsistent claims. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2). Moreover, the argument misperceives the 
doctrine of strict products liability. Just because the plaintiff 
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may have been injured by a defective product does not mean that the 
defendant was not negligent. Many product defects are the result 
of someone's negligence, in designing, manufacturing, testing or 
maintaining the product. The doctrine of strict products liability 
was only meant to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving 
that a defendant was negligent. It does not mean that the 
defendant was not in fact negligent. The defendant may or may not 
have been negligent. The question is simply irrelevant to a strict 
products liability claim. Thus, the fact that the plaintiff may 
have been injured by a defective product does not necessarily mean 
that the accident was not of a type that ordinarily does not occur 
in the absence of negligence. It simply means that the plaintiff 
did not have to prove negligence to recover, but she was still 
entitled to allege negligence and to rely on res ipsa loquitur for 
an inference of negligence, as an alternative to her strict 
products liability claim. Whether or not she could actually prove 
either strict products liability or the elements of res ipsa 
loquitur at trial was not for the trial court to decide from 
disputed evidence and on a motion for leave to amend. 
Other courts, under similar circumstances, have allowed 
plaintiffs to proceed against elevator companies under theories of 
both res ipsa loquitur and strict products liability. See, e.g. , 
Ruiz v. Otis Elevator, 703 P.2d 1247, 1249-51 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1985). Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has allowed plaintiffs to 
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rely on res ipsa loquitur in similar cases. See, e.g., Sansone v. 
J.C. Penney Co.. 17 Utah 2d 46, 404 P.2d 248, 249-50 (1965). The 
plaintiff in Sansone was injured while riding an escalator. "Due 
to the nature of an escalator it was impossible for the plaintiff 
to know or to show just what caused her injury." 404 P.2d at 249. 
The court held that, under the circumstances, the trial court 
properly submitted the case to the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur, even though the plaintiff had placed "100% reliance" on 
the defectiveness of the escalator. See id. at 250 (Henriod, C.J. , 
dissenting). The court stated: 
It is common knowledge that escalators are widely 
used in public buildings . . . and that thousands of 
people . . . use them daily without injury. It is 
certainly not unreasonable for one to assume that it is 
safe to use them in the manner and for the purpose for 
which they were intended. Nor does it depart from reason 
to draw the inference that if an escalator is so used and 
an injury occurs there was something wrong in either the 
construction, maintenance, or operation of the escalator. 
404 P.2d at 249-50 (footnotes omitted). 
What the court said of escalators in Sansone is equally true 
of elevators. Thus, the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to 
state a claim under Utah law based on res ipsa loquitur.6 
6
 For other cases allowing the plaintiff to rely on res ipsa 
loquitur under facts similar to those in Sansone or in this case, 
see Londono v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 766 F.2d 569 
(D.C. Cir. 1985); Simmons v. City Store Co. , 412 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 
1969) (applying Alabama law); Otis Elevator Co. v. Seale, 334 F.2d 
928 (5th Cir. 1964) (applying Louisiana law); Otis Elevator Co. v. 
Henderson, 514 A.2d 784 (D.C. 1986); Ferguson v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 408 So.2d 659, 660-61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), petition 
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The remaining defendants opposed the plaintiff's motion for 
leave to amend on the grounds that the motion was filed some six 
and one-half years after the accident, two and ones-half years after 
the action was filed, and after substantial discovery had been 
completed. They also complained that any new claims the plaintiff 
sought to assert would be barred by the statute of limitations and 
that the proposed amended complaint raised new issues of fact. See 
R. at 257. These objections did not justify the trial court in 
denying the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend any more than 
Kimball's objection did. 
Although the timeliness of a motion to amend is one factor 
Utah courts consider in determining whether the motion should have 
been granted, the cases in which motions to amend were held to have 
been untimely have generally involved motions made on the eve of 
trial. See, e.g., Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co. , 
664 P. 2d 1188, 1189-90 (Utah 1983) (motion made the day of trial); 
Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exch. , 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983) 
(amendment "would certainly have delayed the trial"); Girard v. 
denied, 418 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 1982); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. 
Street, 327 So.2d 113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Otis Elevator Co. 
v. Reid, 706 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Nev. 1985); Burgess v. Otis Elevator 
Co., 495 N.Y.S.2d 376, 379 (App. Div. 1985), aff'd, 503 N.E.2d 692 
(N.Y. 1986); Weeden v. Armor Elevator Co.. 468 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1983); 
Mallor v. Wolk Properties, Inc., 311 N.Y.S.2d 141, 144 (1969); 
Carney v. Otis Elevator Co., 536 A.2d 804, 807 (Pa. Super. 1988); 
McGowan v. Devonshire Hall Apartments, 420 A.2d 514, 518-19 (Pa. 
Super. 1980); Bond v. Otis Elevator Co., 388 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 
1965). 
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Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983) (motion made the day of 
trial); Hein's Turkey Hatcheries, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, 
Inc. , 24 Utah 2d 271, 470 P.2d 257, 257 (1970) (amended answer 
presented for the first time at trial),* Chadwick v, Nielsen
 P 763 
P. 2d 817, 820 (Utah Ct. App* 1988) (motion made the morning of 
trial); Tripp v. Vaughn. 746 P.2d 794, 797-98 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(motion made two weeks before trial). Where an amendment would not 
delay trial, courts have generally allowed the amendment, even 
where the amendment added an issue specifically excluded as a trial 
issue by the pretrial order. See, e.g. , Lewis v. Moultree, 627 
P.2d 94, 97-98 (Utah 1981); Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 
P.2d 1045, 1046 (1971) ("The rule in this state has always been to 
allow amendments freely where justice requires, and especially is 
this true before trial11) (footnote omitted). The primary 
considerations in considering a motion to amend are whether the 
parties have adequate notice to meet new issues and whether any 
party receives an unfair advantage or disadvantage. Rinqwood v. 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1359-60 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). The timeliness of a 
motion to amend is important only where one party is disadvantaged 
by the motion, such as where the party does not have an adequate 
opportunity to prepare its defense. 
Here, the defendants would not have been unfairly 
disadvantaged if the plaintiff had been allowed to amend her 
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complaint to allege res ipsa loquitur. No trial date had yet been 
set. In fact, discovery was still ongoing, and the proposed 
amendment would not have necessitated much further discovery, if 
any. The only new issue raised by the proposed amendment that the 
defendants identified was whether the elevator was under the 
exclusive control and management of the defendants, see R. at 257, 
a matter clearly within their knowledge. Under such circumstances, 
Utah courts freely allow amendments to the pleadings. See, e.g., 
Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Prods., Inc., 30 Utah 2d 
187, 515 P.2d 446, 449-50 (1973); Gillman, 486 P.2d at 1046, 1047; 
Hancock v. Luke, 46 Utah 26, 35-38, 148 P. 452 (1915). 
Moreover, the fact that the motion was made after the statute 
of limitations would otherwise have run on the claim did not 
justify denying the motion. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) 
expressly provides for the relation back of claims made in an 
amended pleading. Thus, amendments are generally allowed even 
though, but for the right to amend, the statute of limitations 
would have run. Meyers v. Interwest Corp. . 632 P. 2d 879, 882 (Utah 
1981) . 
Finally, the plaintiff could have relied on a theory of res 
ipsa loquitur if the evidence at trial established the elements of 
such a claim, even if she had not pled res ipsa loquitur. See Loos 
v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. , 99 Utah 496, 108 P.2d 254, 258-59 
(1940) (remanding to allow amendment of the pleadings to allege res 
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ipsa loquitur where the evidence at trial supported application of 
the doctrine but did not support the specific claims of negligence 
alleged and on which a verdict for the plaintiff was based). Thus, 
the defendants could not have been prejudiced by an amendment to 
allege res ipsa loquitur before trial. 
Leave to amend a complaint must "be freely given when justice 
so requires.11 Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). If the underlying facts or 
circumstances the plaintiff relies on may be a proper subject of 
relief, she ought to be given an opportunity to amend to test her 
claim on the merits. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 
Although the grant or denial of leave to amend is within the trial 
court's discretion, the trial court must justify its refusal to 
permit an amendment. Id; Ondis v. Barrows, 538 F.2d 904, 909 (1st 
Cir. 1976). None of the reasons the defendants asserted justified 
the trial court in denying the plaintiff leave to amend her 
complaint to add a claim based on res ipsa loquitur. Therefore, 
the trial court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's 
motion for leave to amend. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to raise triable 
issues of fact as to whether the elevator that injured her was in 
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user, whether 
the defendants owed the plaintiff a duty of care and, if so, 
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whether they breached that duty. The trial court therefore erred 
in granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment. 
Moreover, the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to infer 
negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The trial 
court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff leave to amend 
to assert such a claim. The orders of the trial court granting the 
defendants summary judgment and denying the plaintiff leave to 
amend should therefore be reversed. 
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